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ALLOWANCES AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTIFICATION 
JESSICA PALMER  
 
This article provides a response to the article in this volume entitled ‘What Shall We 
Do with the Dishonest Fiduciary? The Unpredictability of Allowances for Work and 
Skill’ by Bronwyn Arnold. It begins in Part I with an overview of Arnold’s position and 
moves on to consider the issue of dishonesty in Part II and the notion of unjust 
enrichment in Part III. Part IV explores two narrower grounds upon which allowances 
could be justified and concludes that neither dishonesty nor unjust enrichment provides 
a sound basis for the awarding of an allowance to a breaching fiduciary. 
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I    INTRODUCTION 
A fiduciary breaches his or her fiduciary duty and is required to account to the 
principal for profit made as a result of the breach. What effect, if any, should 
the fiduciary’s exertion of skill and effort have on the remedy that the principal 
receives? Is it appropriate for a fiduciary to be granted an allowance out of the 
profit? This is a question that has received varying responses from courts that 
are near impossible to reconcile, and that have significant implications for our 
understanding of both fiduciary duties and remedies for breach. Bronwyn 
Arnold is to be congratulated for a thought-provoking article that both 
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highlights how inconsistent and therefore problematic the case law is and 
advocates for clarity on this issue.1 
Arnold identifies in the cases what she calls two approaches to determining the 
availability of allowances: the ‘dishonesty approach’ whereby an allowance is 
given to, or withheld from, a breaching fiduciary depending on whether the 
fiduciary’s breach was committed honestly or dishonestly, respectively; and 
the ‘unjust enrichment’ approach whereby an allowance is made in instances 
where the principal could be said to be unjustly enriched by the value of the 
fiduciary’s work and skill applied in making the profit. Having decided that 
the first approach cannot be explained as a concern for deterrence and thus 
ultimately amounts to rewarding an honest defendant and punishing a 
dishonest defendant, Arnold rejects such an approach on the basis that equity 
is not and should not be concerned with punishment. The unjust enrichment 
approach is instead preferred because, it is argued, the fiduciary’s work in 
generating the profit has value, which value belongs to the fiduciary, regardless 
of the fiduciary’s motivation for breach. 
II    DISHONESTY 
Although the cases can be grouped into those that refer to dishonesty and those 
where unjust enrichment is invoked, it is important to note that dishonesty and 
unjust enrichment do not provide alternative answers to the same question. 
Where a court makes an allowance so as to prevent the unjust enrichment of 
the principal, it can be understood as providing a justification for the 
availability of allowances. On the other hand, refusing or reducing an 
allowance where the fiduciary has been dishonest or has acted in bad faith does 
not explain why an allowance would otherwise be given. Dishonesty (or 
honesty) is being used, not as a justification for allowances, but as a mechanism 
to control their availability. More is needed to explain the availability of 
allowances under the dishonesty approach. 
A difficult issue not commented upon in the allowance cases is what amounts 
to dishonesty. What is the relevant standard and how is it to be established in 
each case? Quite apart from this, dishonesty is a problematic restriction on 
allowances if what is meant by this is simply that honest fiduciaries acting in 
good faith should not be punished to the same extent as dishonest fiduciaries 
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by a full accounting of the profit. A contrast between honestly and dishonestly 
breaching fiduciaries is irrelevant because liability for breach is strict. 
Breaching fiduciaries are liable to account, regardless of their motivation to 
breach. A breaching fiduciary’s honesty in so breaching does not justify receipt 
of an allowance, just as it would not for a party breaching a contract or for a 
tortious wrongdoer. To reward honesty would undermine the strict nature of 
the duty. 
Even if allowances could be justified for some other reason, the use of 
dishonesty as a subsequent control factor is inappropriate. Withholding 
allowances from the dishonest fiduciary would be little more than punishment, 
which is inconsistent with equity’s jurisdiction. As is well known, equity and 
penalty are strangers. And, as Arnold argues, it is unlikely that the restriction 
on the availability of allowances has any deterrent effect on breaching 
fiduciaries such as could provide separate justification.2 
III    UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The unjust enrichment approach also has flaws. If unjust enrichment is taken 
to mean that part of the substantive private law that concerns restitution for 
defective transfers, the analysis is strained. Some might suggest that a quantum 
meruit for the value of services would be an appropriate measure of relief 3 but 
a substantive cause of action that justifies this type of relief must be found. 
What would be the ground for saying that the principal’s receipt or retention 
of a full account of profits is unjust? Was the fiduciary mistaken in applying 
their skill or effort for the benefit of the principal such that the principal should 
have to make restitution of the value of that benefit?4 
This seems a little confused given that the fiduciary was obliged to act for the 
benefit of the principal, and the principal will have expected the fiduciary to 
do so. There was a clear basis for the transfer of benefit. The fiduciary was 
already obliged to confer those services on the principal. The presence of the 
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obligation negates any unjust factor (or establishes a basis for the transfer if an 
absence of basis approach is taken to unjust enrichment).5 
It may be that when courts refer to the function of allowances as preventing 
the unjust enrichment of the principal, they are not using unjust enrichment in 
its substantive, technical sense but rather as a label for more popular notions 
of fairness and just desert. The allowance is made as a deduction of gross profit 
on the assumption that the fiduciary should be entitled to the worth of their 
skill and effort.6 In many of the allowances cases, references to justice and 
fairness are not difficult to find. The effect of such statements is really to say 
that the strict remedy of account of profits is an unjust response to breach of 
fiduciary duty because it gives the principal more than that to which they 
should be entitled. However, this sentiment seems to run counter to the nature 
of the fiduciary obligation and the resulting relief from breach and undermines 
the very purpose of appointing a fiduciary (or imposing fiduciary obligations). 
The fiduciary relationship is inherently one where the principals entrust their 
property or interests to the fiduciary and are assured by the application of 
fiduciary duties that the fiduciary will exercise judgement over the property or 
interests loyally for their benefit. The fiduciary’s skill and effort must normally 
be applied for the benefit of the principal by virtue of the fiduciary’s obligation 
of loyalty. Fiduciaries are often appointed specifically for their skill and 
acumen that the principal can expect will be exercised for their benefit. It is 
not an automatic right of the fiduciary to any remuneration for such qualities. 
Indeed, it will be a breach of the fiduciary’s duty to be so remunerated without 
express agreement or authorization. When fiduciaries breach their duty, they 
are required to hand over to the beneficiary everything derived from that act of 
disloyalty. While the remedy may seem harsh in the eyes of the fiduciary or a 
stranger to equity, especially when what was derived was not merely a result 
of the opportunity arising from their fiduciary position but also of their own 
skill and effort, it is nevertheless entirely appropriate in order to give effect to 
the significantly onerous obligation of loyalty. 
IV    ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
There may, however, be two narrower grounds upon which allowances could 
be justified. First, as just suggested, an allowance may be authorised by the 
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principal.7 Just as the duty can be modified by the parties, so too can the nature 
or measure of relief. An allowance may then be available if authorised by the 
principal, whether expressly or impliedly as consistent with the arrangement 
between the parties. For example, a joint venture agreement may permit one of 
the parties to a greater share of the profit on account of their particular expertise 
or the extent of labour exerted and that arrangement may hold even in the event 
of breach in order to give effect to the parties’ intentions.8 
Secondly, an allowance may be appropriate to reflect that portion of the profit 
that was caused by the application of a fiduciary’s own skill, expertise or time 
where, and only where, such skill, expertise or time was not subject to the 
fiduciary duty. So, where a fiduciary is employed for particular expertise or for 
a particular task, and a subsequent profit can be attributed partly to the breach 
of their duty and partly to the application of other skills for which they were 
not appointed or for skills which were applied before they undertook fiduciary 
obligations, then not all of the profit should be subject to the account. In this 
sense, the allowance is operating as a type of remoteness rule employed in 
calculating the profit properly resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty and 
subject thereby to an account. It would probably be better to abandon the 
terminology of allowances in this context to avoid any perception that it is 
some sort of discretionary award distinct from the process of accounting. 
The important point about both of these grounds is that they focus on the 
content of the duty owed by the fiduciary to the principal and, as such, they do 
not conflict with that duty or with the general principle that a breaching 
fiduciary must account for profit made in breach of duty. 
Arnold has admirably endeavoured to provide an account of allowances that 
would allow at least one line of the cases to remain standing, but it seems to 
me that neither dishonesty nor unjust enrichment provides a sound basis for 
the awarding of an allowance to a breaching fiduciary. For the most part, the 
approaches taken by the courts to the question of allowances create confusion 
for the content of the fiduciary duty and the remedy of account of profits. A 
better analysis is, with respect, still awaited. 
 
 
7  Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663. 
8  See alternative approaches on this point in Chirnside v Fay [2007] 1 NZLR 433 (NZSC) and 
Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959. 
